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Abstract
A certified static analysis is an analysis whose semantic validity has been formally proved cor-
rect with a proof assistant. The recent increasing interest in using proof assistants for mechanizing
programming language metatheory has given rise to several approaches for certification of static
analysis. We propose a panorama of these techniques and compare their respective strengths and
weaknesses.
1 Introduction
Nowadays safety critical systems are validated through long and costly test campaigns. Static analysis
is a promising complementary technique that allows to automatically prove the absence of restricted
classes of bugs. A significant example is the state-of-the-art ASTRE´E static analyzer for C [12] which
has proven some critical safety properties for the primary flight control software of the Airbus A340
fly-by-wire system. Taking note of such a success, the next question is: should we completely remove
the test campaign dedicated to the same class of bugs? If we trust the result of the analyzer, of course
the answer is yes, but should we trust it? The analyzer itself can be certified by testing, but exhaustivity
cannot be achieved. In this paper, we show how mechanized proofs can be used to certify static analyzers
or their results.
Abstract interpretation [11] is a general theory that aims at designing provably correct static analyz-
ers, but pencil-and-paper proofs hardly scale to real-size analyzers for real-size programming languages.
Proof assistants [9, 18, 19] allow to mechanically specify, program and prove correct static analyzers with
respect to a formal model of the programming language semantics. If the feasibility of such a technique
has been demonstrated for various kinds of analyses and programming languages [14, 2, 7, 21, 10, 5, 23],
many approaches coexist and some of them differ in the kind of guarantee they give on the targeted static
analysis. In this work, we make a comparison between different techniques, taking into account the
proof effort, the obtained guarantee and maintenance problems. The paper is organized as follows: we
first show how an analysis can be specified depending on the expected guarantees. We then address the
question of computing a certified solution of the analysis. Finally we investigate the use of deductive
verification to validate the invariant generated by an analysis.
For presentation purposes, all the analyzes we describe here will share a common semantical basis,
which we give below, together with a summary of abstract interpretation principles. A program P is
a graph (N,E) where N ≥ 1 is the number of vertices (control points), and E a set of edges (n,m) ∈
{1..N}×{1..N}. Each edge is labeled by an instruction in,m from a set I. Among nodes, we distinguish
an entry point ne such that there is no incoming edge in ne. A state of a program P is composed of a
control point n and an environment ρ: State = {1..N}×Env. The concrete semantics of an instruction
i∈ I is given by a binary relation→i over Env. The transfer function Fi :P (Env)→P (Env) associated
to instruction i is then defined by Fi(S) = {ρ
′ | ∃ρ ∈ S : ρ →i ρ
′}. Given S0 an initial set of environments,
the collecting semantics JPKc of P is the least solution X ∈P (Env)N of Sne = S0 and ∀m∈ {1..N}, Sm =⋃
(n,m)∈E Fin,m(Sn).
The abstract interpretation formalism gives us a way to over-approximate the solution to these equa-
tions. An abstract semantics is expressed w.r.t. an abstract domain1 Env♯ (usually a complete lattice
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1Here we focus on the specific case where the abstract states are mappings from {1..N} to Env♯.
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(Env♯,⊑♯)), and the relation between concrete and abstract semantics is given by a Galois connec-
tion (α,P (Env) ,Env♯,γ), i.e. a pair of monotone mappings such that ∀S ⊆ Env : S ⊆ γ(α(S)) and
∀d ∈ Env♯ : α(γ(d)) ⊑♯ d. The abstraction function α maps a set S of environments to an abstract en-
vironment, which can be seen as the least property satisfied by all elements of S. The concretization
function γ maps an abstract environment to all the concrete environments satisfying the corresponding
property. We are interested in computing an abstract semantics JPK♯ : {1..N}→ Env♯ which is a certified
correct (over-)approximation of the concrete collecting semantics, i.e. ∀i ∈ {1..N} : JPKc(i)⊆ γ(JPK♯(i)).
In addition to the systematic treatment of this safety issue, the theory provides an optimal specifica-
tion of the abstract semantics: given a mapping F : P (Env)→P (Env), a correct abstraction of F is a
mapping F♯ verifying F ◦ γ ⊆ γ ◦F♯, or equivalently α ◦F ◦ γ ⊑♯ F
♯. The case where F♯ = α ◦F ◦ γ thus
provides the best correct abstraction of F . The abstract semantics computed by the analyzer will then
mimic the collecting semantics, in the sense that it also operates through abstract transfer functions F
♯
i .











i is proved an optimal correct abstraction of Fi. In order to save space, all properties like
α(S0)⊑♯ S
♯
ne dealing with the treatment of initial states will be discarded from the rest of this paper.
2 Analyzer Specification
Analysis soundness must be established with respect to the concrete semantics using a correctness rela-
tion that relates the concrete and the abstract domains. In this section we consider two formal frameworks
that both enforce the following essential soundness property: any solution S♯ of (1) is a correct approxi-
mation of JPKc. Various ways can be taken between these two opposite approaches, some of them have
been investigated in [14, 7, 21, 10, 5].
2.1 Deep Analyzer Specification
This first approach (so far only experimented in [16]) exactly follows the Galois connection formalism
by providing mechanized proofs of all the classical properties. We briefly recall the components of a
static analyzer based on this formalism and make more precise the proof requirements.
component mathematical structure properties to prove
abstract domain complete lattice ({1..N}→ Env♯,⊑˙
♯
, ⊔˙♯, ⊓˙♯) existence of a lub
correctness relation Galois connection (α,P (Env) ,Env♯,γ) Galois connection definition
abstract semantics abstract transfer functions F
♯
i = α ◦Fi ◦ γ
Defining the abstract domain as a complete lattice constrains us to provide a proof of existence of
a least upper bound for any subset of abstract elements (or a least fixpoint for any monotone function).
Moreover, from a proof assistant point of view, the ⊔♯ operator is not constructive, which hampers its
implementation. Taking a Galois connection as a correctness criterion also increases the number of
proofs to be done, since this also provides an optimality property.
Let us take an example to illustrate this point. We consider a numerical abstraction based on the
domain of intervals. The concrete domain is (P (Z) ,⊆,∪,∩), and the abstract domain is the lattice
of intervals {[a,b] | a ∈ Z∪ {−∞},b ∈ Z∪ {+∞},a ≤ b} ∪⊥Int. The corresponding abstraction and
concretization functions are defined by the following equations
γ(⊥Int) = /0
γ([a,b]) = {x ∈ Z | a≤ x ≤ b}
α(P) =
{
⊥Int if P = /0
[ inf(P),sup(P)] otherwise
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If we want to compute α ◦F ◦γ for a given computable function F , the use of α might force us to provide
a proof that a given subset of Z is not bounded to ensure that ⊤ = [−∞,+∞] is a correct result of the
analysis. If no optimality property were involved, ⊤ could be taken as a correct result in any case. As an
example of abstract transfer function, let us now consider an operator ×♯ intended to abstract the integer
multiplication. Given intervals [a,a′] and [b,b′], let [c,d] = [a,b]×♯ [a′,b′]. Soundness of the abstract
operator means that a ≤ x ≤ b and a′ ≤ x′ ≤ b′ imply c ≤ x× x′ ≤ d, while its optimality additionally
ensures that c = inf{x×x′ | a≤ x≤ b and a′ ≤ x′ ≤ b′} and d = sup{x×x′ | a≤ x≤ b and a′ ≤ x′ ≤ b′}.
2.2 Shallow Analyzer Specification
A second approach consists in focusing only on the soundness of the analysis, without considering the
optimality issue. The choices made here are directly inspired from [13], where the authors describe the
design of the ASTRE´E static analyzer.
component mathematical structure properties to prove
abstract domain (Env♯,⊑♯,⊔
♯,⊓♯) no requirements on ⊑♯,⊔
♯ or ⊓♯
correctness relation γ : Env♯ →P (Env) ∀c,d ∈ Env♯,c⊑♯ d ⇒ γ(c)⊆ γ(d)
abstract semantics abstract transfer functions soundness: Fi ◦ γ ⊆ γ ◦F
♯
i
Let us consider again the ×♯ operator. Its definition could include the following statement: [a,b]×♯
⊤=⊤, which is a correct approximation. A more precise one would be [a,b]×♯⊤= 0 if a = b = 0, ⊤
otherwise, but could be missed by our analysis, since optimality is not required any more. Hence, if the
shallow framework requires far less machine proofs than the deep framework, it ensures only a minimal
amount of properties on the analysis which is doubtless sound but may still contain several precision
bugs that are notoriously hard to debug.
3 Result Computation
The requirements made during the specification phase ensure that any solution of (1) is a correct ap-
proximation of JPKc, but do not specify how a solution is computed. One has to choose between various
certification levels: from a complete proof of the whole analysis computation to a result-only certifica-
tion.
3.1 Termination
If we aim at certifying the whole analyzer, we have to prove the termination of an algorithm computing
a solution of (1). Termination proofs are known to be difficult and are seldom mechanized, or even pre-
cisely formalized. Even if we consider a complete lattice, the existence of a least fixpoint for monotone
functions does not ensure the convergence of the computation in finite time. Except for the trivial case
of finite height lattices, we have to exhibit specific properties of the domain, or to design operators that
will ensure convergence.
A first approach consists in certifying that the lattice respects the ascending chain condition, i.e. that
any increasing chain stabilizes in finite time. The main drawback of this approach is that it does not
apply to popular abstract domains like intervals or polyhedra. A more common approach consists in
designing widening and narrowing operators in order to accelerate the convergence [11]. The widening
operator provides a guarantee to reach a post-fixpoint in finite time, while the narrowing operator is
used to improve the precision of this post-fixpoint by a descending iteration. In both approaches, a
mechanized proof of termination has to cope with constructivity issues, and the criteria of ascending
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chain or termination of widening-based iteration have to be modified in consequence. In any case, a
key issue for termination proofs is to provide modular lattice constructions, thus allowing for building a
global proof out of basic blocks (usual numerical abstract domains for instance) [14, 20].
If one wants to avoid to perform tedious termination proofs, it is also possible to artificially bound
the number of iterations in the abstract semantics computation [15]. In that case, one has to certify that
any iteration yields a correct result, even if not the best one, or to check that the final result is indeed a
correct approximation of the concrete semantics. This technique leads us to result certification.
3.2 Result-only Certification
In a safety-critical context, it is likely that the high confidence we are looking for is not for all results of
the analyzer but for a few specific ones like those obtained for the next version of the flight-command
program. Instead of globally certifying the analyzer itself, it might be interesting to provide a tool
that checks the correctness of its result. This approach is directly related to the Proof Carrying Code
technique [17, 1], where the code producer provides a formal proof that the code respects some safety
requirements defined by the end-user. The user then verifies the proof with an automated and trusted
checker. This use of a PCC technique for analysis certification has been proposed in [6]. The main
requirement is the same as in the previous approaches: we still have to give a proof that Fi ◦ γ ⊆ γ ◦F
♯
i .
But now, instead of computing a solution of (1), we just have to check that a given certificate S♯ is indeed
a solution. Note that this proof can be automatically discharged by a computation.
4 Deductive Verification of Analysis Results
Since the main goal of static analysis is to generate invariants over program executions, it is natural to
try to validate these invariants with deductive verification techniques that are traditionally applied for
handwritten program invariants. In this section, we assume an axiomatic semantics given by a deductive
judgment ⊢ {φ} i {ψ} for each instruction i ∈ I such that, when property φ holds before executing i, ψ
must hold after. Here, φ and ψ are formulas in a given logic language L . We denote by pi : {φ}i{ψ} a
Hoare-proof derivation pi that is a valid proof of ⊢ {φ} i {ψ}. We note ρ |= φ when an environment ρ
satisfies property φ . To validate a set of invariants φ1, . . . ,φN attached to each control point, it is sufficient
to provide a set of Hoare proofs pin,m : {φn} in,m {φm} for all (n,m) in E.
An analysis result has to be first transformed into a set of assertions in the language L . We thus
assume that each abstract element a♯ ∈ Env♯ can be translated into a formula pa♯q in L . For an interval
analysis where we attach an interval to each variable of a program (restricted here to x and y), and for
a first order language with arithmetic, any abstract element {x : [a,b],y : [b,c]} will be translated into a
formula like a≤x≤b∧ c≤y≤d.
In this setting, an analysis result S♯ is certified once the following statements have been formally machine
checked.
Hoare logic soundness ⊢ {φ} i {ψ} implies (∀ρ,ρ ′,ρ →i ρ
′ and ρ |= A implies ρ ′ |= B)
Provability of assertions ∀(n,m) ∈ E, {pS♯nq} in,m {pS
♯
mq}is provable
The advantage of the approach is that the soundness of Hoare logic can be proved once and for all, and
used for several static analyses. If we assume that the Hoare logic is not only sound but also complete,
that transformation p·q preserves satisfiability (i.e. for all ρ ∈ Env and a♯ ∈ Env♯, ρ ∈ γ(a♯) iff ρ |= pa♯q ),
and that each transfer function F
♯
i is sound w.r.t. Fi, then the corresponding set of Hoare triples is provable
for any solution S♯ of the analysis. However, a proof of these triplets still has to be constructed, without
entering a painful manual process for each of them. A first approach, proposed by Seo et. al. [22],
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instruments the analyzer to make it produce a proof derivation pin,m for all edges (n,m). This approach
has also been followed by Beringer et. al. [3, 4] who translate type derivations into Hoare proofs. The
approach proposed independently by Chaieb [8] relies on a weakest precondition computation. This
time the analyzer is instrumented to produce proof terms for the verification conditions generated by a
weakest precondition computation. If these approaches are elegant, they remain difficult to implement
because generating proof terms requires more technical ability than transposing a pencil-and-paper proof
into a proof assistant.
Ideally, the proof obligations (obtained for example with the weakest precondition calculus) should
be automatically discharged by a trustworthy theorem prover, hence the uselessness of generating proofs.
However, each analysis may require specific decision procedures. For example, in the interval analysis
the verification condition for the Hoare triplet {p{x : [1,2] y : [3,4]}q} x := x ∗ y {p{x : [3,8] y : ⊤}q}
will be (1≤ x≤ 2∧3≤ y≤ 4)⇒ (3≤ x×y≤ 8) which does not fall in the Presburger arithmetic frag-
ment.nstead of producing a specific proof for each verification condition, we believe it may be a better
idea to strengthen the theorem prover with a decision procedure able to discharge exactly this kind of
formula. In addition to validating the analysis result, it is likely to improve the prover itself. Since each
analyzer addresses dedicated decision procedures in its transfer functions and partial order tests, it would
be useful to share this capability with an automatic prover. The research line we advocate here is then to
design abstract domains and decision procedures in parallel. To ensure the validity of the approach, the
decision procedures must themselves be certified, i.e. must generate proof terms of validity.
5 Conclusion
We have considered several techniques for certifying the soundness of a static analyzer or of its result.
Of course, there is no silver-bullet technique: if the deep approach is the most greedy in terms of proof
effort, it is the only one that detects precision bugs. Revealing such bugs too late during a validation cam-
paign may compromise the availability of the safety critical system that has to be validated in due time.
Deductive verification appears as a promising technique but its apparent generality must be tempered: the
underlying logic is not always expressive enough to translate the result of the analysis and automatically
discharging verification conditions requires technical instrumentation of the analyzer. Building abstract
domains and decision procedures in parallel seems an interesting research line to push further.
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